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Abstract 
This paper studies the attitudes of “Christian Europe”1   vis-à-vis the integration of Turkey into 
the European Union (EU) through the case study of minority rights in Turkey. There are some re-
search articles on the issue of the contribution of the Catholic Church in the EU project, but through 
the mirror of Turkey, the research is very limited. (Aydın 2009; Minkenberg 2012) regarding this 
topic, Aydın’s as yet uncompleted research is very useful to understand the point of view of the 
Church in EU vis-à-vis Turkey’s candidacy. On the one hand, the literature on Turkish minorities 
places great importance on considering how the Turkish political system affects minority rights. 
In this literature, some research has focused on the Turkish candidacy and minority issues. 
(Oran 2003; Toktas, Saraçlı 2007; 2006; Toktas and Aras 2009)  During the candidacy processes, 
Turkey has changed some of its laws on minority issues according to the acquis communautaire of 
European Union. (Toktas 2006)  On the other hand, the lack of the Church and Church related or-
ganizations’ positive attitudes to engaging in a dialogue with local Christian communities during 
the Turkish membership application process is problematic. Even though Turkey has the smallest 
number of Christian population in the region, when compared with Egypt, Syria, the Catholic or-
ganizations took some initiatives at EU level to exert pressure and enhance the political awareness 
of EU deputies and commissionaires regarding Christian minorities’ problems in Turkey. 
Keywords
Turkey, Christian Minorities, EU-Turkey, Church-EU, Religion and Politics.
1 By “Christian Europe” we mean Christian expression of Europe through the voice and the mobilization of 
three main Christian churches: Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox. 
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This paper aims to analyse the positions 
adopted by Christian churches through their 
representative organizations in the Euro-
pean institutions in Brussels on the issue of 
Christian minorities in Turkey and the ques-
tion of Turkey’s accession to membership of 
the European Union. These two issues are 
different, however the Christian transna-
tional organizations seem to interest Tur-
key’s candidacy through the Christian mi-
norities in Turkey. The Church, having had 
their representative offices in Brussels and 
Strasbourg (some of them since the 1960s); 
try to determine and put into practice new 
strategies, to create new structures and in-
ter-Christian organizations to adapt them-
selves to compete in the new context after 
the Lisbon Treaty that boosted EU-Church 
relations.1 The activities of Churches’ rep-
resentative organisations, like COMECE or 
KEK; or religious associations such as Pax 
Christi, Caritas in Brussels are not limited 
to defending the interests of Churches. They 
participate actively in the formation of Eu-
ropean policies in all domains, from sustain-
able development to human trafficking and 
immigration questions. The commitment 
to remind participants in the construction 
of contemporary Europe and to make them 
take into account Christian roots and identi-
ty revealed themselves to be one of the fun-
damental concerns of Churches, as we have 
seen during the debate about the European 
constitution. This article would like to em-
phasize on the religious dynamics of these 
transnational networks and organizations. 
In the first section, religion will be exam-
ined in its role as a (re)source of opposition/
resistance and/or a (re)source of support 
1  The article 17 of Lisbon Treaty sends clearly EU 
institutions to make dialogue with Churches and religio-
us associations in a “open, transparent and regular” way. 
This article give more prominent status and recognition 
to the Churches and established religions in Europe. 
and legitimacy in the European Union, par-
ticularly concerning the enlargement pro-
cess and the Turkish EU membership appli-
cation. In this part, the question of religion 
in the debates about European constitution 
and European identity will in particular be 
discussed. In the second section, which will 
constitute the heart of the research, the at-
titude of European Churches will be studied 
vis-à-vis the Christian minorities in Tur-
key during the Turkish membership ap-
plication process – the following questions 
will be posed and answers sought: How did 
they conceive and react to policies regard-
ing Turkey’s European membership appli-
cation project?. What are the structures of 
Christian Europe at the national and Euro-
pean level through which they express their 
points of view and defend their vision on 
Christian minorities’ rights? What are the 
relationships they entertain or maintain 
with European institutions, political parties, 
especially Christian Democrat parties to de-
fend the religious freedom in Turkey? What 
are the motives, whether religious or not, 
that determine or influence their commit-
ments? How do the churches communicate 
their viewpoints on the Turkish issue? 
This paper will be based on the European 
mobilisations and discourses of two main 
Christian organizations: The Commission of 
Bishops’ Conferences of the European Com-
munity (COMECE) and the Conference of 
European Churches (CEC-KEK). 
The Catholic Church constitutes the old-
est and most active religious participant 
with its multi-faceted presence in Euro-
pean construction: Nonciature, COMECE 
and many congregation based associations 
in Brussels. By means of Nonciature, the 
Catholic Church enjoys the privilege of hav-
ing a diplomatic representation in European 
institutions. 
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Regarding Protestant organisations, 
which have no hierarchical or central struc-
tures, the activities of the Conference of 
European Churches (CEC-KEK) which com-
bines Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox 
Churches have been examined. Our analy-
sis will mainly be based on their activities 
and discourses, which focus on religious 
freedom, to see how they perceive Turkish 
membership prospects being influenced by 
internal minority issues. 
The Conference of European Churches 
(CEC-KEK) is an ecumenical loose organi-
zation of churches in Europe whose aims 
are to seek help for Churches in Europe in 
renewing spiritual life and in promoting the 
unity of the Church, according the prelimi-
nary constitution of the CEC. The Central 
Committee consists of 40 members who are 
responsible for the implementation of the 
decisions taken by the Assembly. 
The three commissions, Churches in Dia-
logue, Church and Society and the Churches’ 
Commissions, exist within the CEC. They 
work on different areas such as migration, 
asylum, Orthodox-Protestant dialogue, and 
theological education, social and ethical is-
sues within the European context. 
Religion as Resource for the 
Church in EU
The existence of these kinds of organiza-
tions such as COMECE and KEK is relevant 
to understanding how religious policies are 
implemented in a political area and domain. 
As some secularization theorists highlight-
ed, religion today has lost its influence as a 
“structure structured” to shape political and 
social orientations, but in some ways reli-
gious influence is returning to the public life 
in different ways that suggest the existence 
of a post secular phenomenon (Habermas 
2008; Norris and Ingelhart 2004). Secularity 
is not rejected, in the main, but postmodern 
times are witnessing an interrelationship 
between secularity and religiousness which 
go hand in hand. In other words in this new 
process in a secular age, as Charles Taylor 
formulates it, religion has not disappeared. 
The decline of the traditional role of the 
Church, prevented from official participa-
tion in public political arenas coincided with 
the relegation of religion to private life and 
the secularization processes in society. The 
dominant paradigm up to the 80’s was the 
secularisation principles that emphasised 
rationalization and individualization pro-
cesses and caused the decline of religious 
participation in society (Berger 1999). 
A secular society, neutrality of the state 
and autonomy of religious cultures relative 
to all other spheres, signifies the marginal-
izing of religion in both private and pub-
lic life, the losing of religious ideology as a 
meta-narrative. Casanova points out the 
distinction between “secular”, “seculariza-
tion” and “secularism” to grasp multiple ex-
periences-forms of being secular (Casanova 
2011). In this vein, decline-differentiation-
privatization is analysed during the histori-
cal patterns of secularization. The long-term 
changes and the progressive secularisation 
of Europe since the sixteenth century has 
positioned Europe in a particular form of re-
ligion-state relationship. Largely inspired by 
the enlightenment philosophers who argued 
for non-religious states and societies, the 
idea of a secular society had an impact on the 
reformulation of Christian values and the 
Church such as the separation between state 
and church. Religious crises appeared, along 
with protests against any kind of authority 
during the late 60s; these phenomena have 
expanded secular influences into different 
social cultural spheres in which religious 
roles have been reduced and minimized 
(Casonova 1994). Daniel Hervieu Leger 
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speaks about the impossibility of maintain-
ing “lignee croyante”, the chain of memory 
that constitutes the core of religion in this 
secular society, where the confessional cul-
ture has lost its force (Hervieu-Leger 2000). 
But these phenomena have not resulted in 
the disappearance of the mainline churches, 
which are also in crisis in terms of attracting 
followers and members to their community. 
The Church speaks and acts in many dif-
ferent ways according to their organization 
and their structure. Even though the secu-
larisation process pressured religious groups 
and the Church to avoid intervention in 
politics and thereby resulted in the loss of 
the traditional positions of authority and 
power of the Church, religion still shapes in 
different ways the political decisions in their 
evolution processes, opinion formation on 
ethical and identity questions. 
The Church has become increasingly ac-
tive in terms of the issuing of statements, 
propositions, and working papers to indi-
cate to other political bodies what principles 
to apply. The activities and propositions of 
Church concern many societal problems 
that Europe has faced. Their activities are 
no longer limited to traditional religious 
fields, but extend into different areas and 
fields where the Church elaborates its views. 
In the last few years, these activities have 
gained momentum regarding social issues. 
More and more concretely, they release 
statements of their positions on several 
matters in order to influence policy and to 
shape the consciences of the members of 
secular bodies. 
The social agenda of the Christian 
Churches evolved and changed after the Sec-
ond World War and this evolution has been 
linked to those of social ethics (Verstraeten 
2010, 176). These have been caused by great 
changes in society affecting Christian at-
titudes: the Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948, the Cold War, the discovery of 
the Third World, globalisation, neo-liberal 
economic politics, individualization, mi-
gration, the relationships with other faiths 
and religions especially with Islam. These 
socio-political changes have influenced the 
repositioning of the Church in social life. 
Verstraeten analysed how the Churches have 
adopted new discourse styles and strategies 
to promote social-ethical messages to a wid-
er spectrum of society (Verstraeten 2010).
It is interesting that the Church repre-
sentatives at a bishops’ conference seriously 
examined secular topics such as disarma-
ment and security questions during the Cold 
War. (Cf Dutch case Everts, 1983) and The 
Treaty of Lisbon recognizes the contribu-
tions of the Church and religious commu-
nities to the integration process of Europe. 
Article 17 of TFEU emphasizes the collabo-
rations between EU institutions and reli-
gious and non-religious communities.
The Church and the Europe
Historically, the Churches have played 
a crucial role in the construction of na-
tion-states and regional or national col-
lective identities in European history 
(Williame, 2004). The post-war European 
development has been a trans-national proj-
ect to which Churches have not been indif-
ferent from its very beginning. The Catholic 
Church especially, which committed itself 
to the Franco-German reconciliation after 
World War II, was actively involved in the 
project of a European union. Together with 
the Christian Democrat politicians, the 
Catholic Church was also interested, espe-
cially during the papacy of Pius XII, in the 
political or institutional future of a possible 
European union (Aydın, 2009, 175).
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The institutionalisation of European 
Catholic structures lasted in a longue duree. 
From 1962, the Holy See became a member 
of The Council of Europe, thereby acquiring 
full membership rights. The first Catholic 
religious initiative was born through a cir-
cle of activists committed to the Franco-
German reconciliation in the 1950s. The 
Catholic Secretariat for European problems 
was founded by Jesuit intellectuals, and 
then became the European Catholic Pastoral 
Information Service (SIPECA, 1976-1980). 
This structure was not an organization that 
coordinated the Catholic NGOs, but it was 
a centre of reflection on the European prob-
lems. It was not like the COMECE and CEC, 
but loosely linked and more autonomous in 
terms of organization and workings (Mas-
signon, 2007: 38). At the end of the Vatican 
Council II, a meeting of thirteen Presidents 
of the European Bishops’ Conference was 
held to form a committee which resulted 
in the creation of the Consilium Conferen-
tiarum Episcoporum Europae (CCEE). It is a 
working body of the Bishops’ Conferences of 
Europe. Its aim is to further the cooperation 
and coordination among the Bishops in Eu-
rope, the promotion of evangelism ecumen-
ism and Christian unity in Europe.
COMECE is the Commission of the Bish-
ops’ Conferences of the European Commu-
nity, Bishops are delegated from all parts 
of the EU. COMECE was launched in 1980, 
after the SIPECA. It was created to ensure 
strong liaison channels between the Bishops’ 
Conferences and the European Community 
political entities. The objectives of COMECE 
are, according their website: to monitor and 
analyse the political processes of the Euro-
pean Union, to inform and raise awareness 
within the Church of the development of EU 
policy and legislation, to maintain a regular 
dialogue with the EU Institutions (The Euro-
pean Commission, Council of Ministers and 
European Parliament), to promote reflection 
based on the Churches’ social teachings, on 
the challenges facing a united Europe.
 The second major organization, the CEC, 
came into being after the Second World War 
to overcome the divisions between Churches 
in Eastern and Western Europe. The repre-
sentatives of more than forty churches came 
together in Nyborg Strand in Denmark for 
the first Assembly of the CEC in 1959. At 
the 1964 assembly, they adopted a constitu-
tion to form a regional church conference. 
It is a body of about 120 Orthodox, Protes-
tant, Anglican and long established Catholic 
Churches. CEC has offices in Geneva, Brus-
sels and Strasbourg. 
This Catholic interest has even provoked 
controversies and aroused suspicions about 
the existence of the “myth” of “a Vatican Eu-
rope” in some countries such as in Germany, 
European Nordic Countries where Protes-
tants are dominant or equal with Catholics 
in terms of population (Massignon 2007, 
49). It is misinforming to characterize Prot-
estants as Eurosceptic. Indeed the Protes-
tant tradition embodies significant efforts 
to promote the idea of internationalism in 
Europe even though there is a particularly 
strong feeling against the idea of European 
Union among smaller hardline Protestant 
churches and personalities. The divisions 
among Christians are also significant since 
they encompass the attitudes of historically 
Nordic Protestant countries and the United 
Kingdom, which have conflicting views re-
garding the construction of a European po-
litical Union. (Massignon 2007) 
Before the Treaty of Rome, the Vatican 
attempted to reunify the European churches 
after the two world wars that had ruined 
Europe, so that it would be divided between 
the communist bloc and an Occidental lib-
eral bloc. Vatican would have liked to unify 
these two blocs, Protestant and Catholic, 
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against the communist bloc. They defend-
ed the concept of a unified Europe, which 
would allow the Church to have more liberty 
than in Eastern Europe. They worked on this 
issue and mobilized political efforts with the 
aim of a single Europe (Massignon 2007).
So the project and idea of a unified Eu-
rope targeted by the Catholics and Protes-
tants, had its roots for many years before 
the first treaties that opened the way to the 
formation of the EU.  In the 50’s the Papacy 
developed discourses regarding the creating 
of a single European entity, although the in-
stitutionalization processes necessary to re-
alize this objective were quite late in gather-
ing momentum (Massignon 2007, 27). The 
roles of lay Catholic people who were not 
in the papal hierarchy were essential in the 
initiation of the political project of unifying 
Europe. The origins of the European project 
were started with the initiatives of Robert 
Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi and Konrad 
Adenauer who were Catholics. The politi-
cal project that they conceived reflects the 
Catholic Internationalism now manifested 
in the European Union.   
Vatican does not want to intervene in 
political issues as popes have underlined in 
their speeches (Massignon 2007, 28) even 
to the point of an official distinction being 
made between political and non political ac-
tivity when Church affiliated organizations 
develop any policies on various issues such 
as the environment, human trafficking, hu-
man and religious rights (cf the webpage of 
COMECE). The reports that have claimed a 
change and different orientation in some 
politics raise some questions about how 
the Church deals in politics without inter-
vening in it. The Churches have developed 
diplomatic channels and processes within 
the framework of their participation in civil 
society in the process of policy and decision-
making, to contribute to a faith oriented 
public policy. The papacy engagement in EU 
affairs and diplomacy is identifiable precise-
ly as a faith based diplomacy. The political 
unity of the EU has its roots in the unity of 
Christianity in Europe. 
Pope John Paul II commented many 
times on the moral decline of Europe and 
the necessity of Christian values to en-
hance European social values, saying that 
Europe needed more spiritual force to es-
cape the moral illness that it had faced for 
many years. For John-Paul II, “the crises of 
Europeans are the crises of Christians. The 
crises of European cultures are the crises of 
Christian culture”. (VI Symposium of CCEE, 
Roma, 1985) 
The Papacy also defends a universal 
peace between East -West, North-South as 
an important element for the reconciliation 
after the two world wars. Europe is consid-
ered as a peace land in which to procure a se-
cure and a safe environment for the spread 
of Christianity. The unification of Europe 
provides more opportunities for the Vatican 
to circulate its message through the estab-
lishment of liberal democracies in Europe. In 
this unified Europe, the Church can defend 
more easily biblical principles of solidarity 
to stimulate gatherings between Christians 
(Ladriere 1989). 
Among popes, Pope Pius XII is an em-
blematic figure who was engaged openly in 
favour of the construction of a united Eu-
rope during his time as Pope. (1939-1958) 
During this period, the Cold War influenced 
the position of Vatican against the Soviet 
blocs. Pius XII supported openly, at the Sa-
cred College of Cardinals, the construction 
of a small European entity in 1948. The Vati-
can welcomed with enthusiasm the signa-
ture of the Treaty of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) that was signed in 
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Paris in 1951.2 Marcel Launay says that from 
this treaty, the pontifical discourses were 
well adapted to the project of European in-
tegration and Vatican engaged readily in the 
new diplomatic processes in Europe (Launay 
1999, 78-80). The Pope underlined also the 
importance of this integration and he has 
become a fervent supporter of The Europe-
an Defence Community (EDC)3 (Cheneaux 
1990, 282). 
John Paul II (1978-2005), a significant 
person who supported Lech Walesa dur-
ing his fights to overthrow Communism 
in Poland, has had a direct effect on Euro-
pean politics and contributed to the idea 
of a confederation of Europe rather than a 
supranational entity when he gave a speech 
at The Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 
1987 (La Documentation Catholique n.1971 
pp.1043-1046).
In his speech, he also reminded the world 
of the Christian roots of Europe,  of the his-
tory of  the continent of having disseminat-
ed the message of Christianity. 
 “For centuries Europe played a consider-
able role in other parts of the world. It must 
be admitted that it did not always show its 
best side in its encounters with other civi-
lisations, but no one can contest that it did 
felicitously share many of the values which 
it had matured over a long period. Its sons 
played a key part in disseminating the Chris-
tian message. If Europe today wishes to play 
a part, it must, in unity, calmly base its ac-
tion on what is most human and most gen-
erous in its heritage”  (8 October 1988). 
2  The treaty brought France, Germany, Italy and 
the Benelux countries  together come to agreement to 
organize free movement of coal and steel and free access 
to sources of production.  This treaty is at the origin of 
the first project of European Union.  
3  It was set up in 1952 to counterbalance the mili-
tary ascendance of Soviet Union by the formation of a 
supranational European army.
He contributes to the unification of Eu-
rope by saying, in 1985 “Europeans can-
not sit back and accept the division of their 
continent. The countries which, for differ-
ent reasons, are not members of your in-
stitutions cannot be kept back from a fun-
damental desire for unity; their particular 
contribution to European heritage cannot 
be ignored.”. For John Paul II, European 
countries shared a common culture and her-
itage which is Christianity. His message laid 
stress on the Christian identity of Europe 
rather than its existence as an economical 
entity. Asking for European unity, for him, 
was to insist on a spiritual and cultural com-
munity that Europe should evolve into, in 
time (Ronciere 2008). One can reconsider 
this attempt as a re-conversion of Europe, 
the return of Europe to its civil and religious 
roots (Weigel 2005). 
These messages indicate that there is a 
strong ambition in the Vatican to influence 
the political union of the European Union. 
With this view in mind, Pope John Paul II 
underlined the need for a religious dimen-
sion in Europe. “…The Catholic Church can 
offer a unique contribution to the building 
up of a Europe open to the world.” (2003) 
At the moment when the Maastricht 
Treaty was signed in February 1992, which 
founded the EU political integration, a com-
mon framework of justice, home affairs, 
foreign and security policies came into exist-
ence for the first time between the founding 
twelve member states of the EU. The treaty 
created the concept of European citizenship, 
and reinforced the representation powers 
of the European Parliament.  This political 
integration did not attract the attention of 
the Papacy as before, but at the same time, 
the tonality of discourse acquired a new 
perspective after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union: enlargement to East Europe. The idea 
of “small Europe” evolved to one of “great 
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Europe” with John Paul II. The change of 
this ideological direction in the Vatican was 
the result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
communism. The support of East European 
countries against the expansion of the athe-
ism of communist totalitarian regimes in 
order to bring them back to their Christian 
roots and heritage, is one of the obvious ob-
jectives of the Vatican (Chenaux 1990). 
After the second Synod of Bishops of 
Europe, in his post synodic apostolic exhor-
tation, Pope Johm Paul II mentioned the 
loss memory of Europe’s Christian herit-
age, which had resulted in a kind of agnos-
ticism, living without believing. The synod 
described as a challenge for the Church, the 
fact that Europe was the most secularized 
part of the world. This “religious rootless-
ness” was the central message in his apos-
tolic Exhortation. The Pope called for a re-
turn to Christian values and identity that he 
believed Europe needed in order to renew 
itself.  For him, Europe was more than a geo-
graphical area, and “primarily cultural and 
historical concept” in which Christianity 
could be considered as a unifying force that 
enabled the integration of people and cul-
tures to harmonize them into a single Euro-
pean culture and identity. The core concept 
that the Vatican used in this framework was 
historical and cultural rather then political. 
Today, the fundamental values such as 
the transcendent dignity of the human per-
son, reason, freedom, democracy, the con-
stitutional state, the distinction between 
political life and religion have taken root in 
Christianity.  These are also certain values 
that Europe acquired through Christianity.4 
The Church draws more attention to human 
4  Synod of Bishops – First Special Assembly for 
Europe, Final Declaration (13 December 1991), 2: Ench. 
Vat. 13, No. 619.
dignity, a central concept in Christian val-
ues, which is anchored in the experience of 
God (van Luyn 2007, 74) in order to forge 
common values based on and inspired by 
Christian faith in Europe.
In this respect, even Turkey’s member-
ship is not a core subject of debate among 
Christian organizations; the Christian 
Church interests are in fundamental human 
rights and Turkey’s candidacy provides an 
opportunity to play a role in the resolution 
of issues of religious freedom by exerting 
pressure on EU institutions. 
The Turkish Candidacy: 
Religious Freedom, Dialogue 
with Islam and Muslims 
Another essential value in the eyes of 
the pontiff was the right of religious free-
dom, which Pope John Paul II emphasized 
especially before 1989, while many peoples 
of Europe still suffered from the oppression 
of the Communist regimes (Ronciere 2008, 
256). Before the “challenge of Islam”, the 
problematic areas were in the communist 
bloc. These  have been replaced by Muslim 
countries where Christian communities suf-
fer from oppression after the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall.
  Furthermore, John Paul II underlines, 
in that same apostolic exhortation, the 
need for a subtitle dialogue with Muslims 
who live in Europe. The demographic im-
portance of increasing Muslim communi-
ties pushes the Vatican to take initiatives 
on this issue to found a formal relationship 
with Muslims “with clear ideas about pos-
sibilities and limits, and with confidence…”. 
The Pope emphasized learning and obtain-
ing information and objective knowledge 
of Islam through the seminarians, priests 
and pastoral workers. At the same time, the 
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same discourse pointed to the differences 
and the gaps between European cultures 
and Muslim thought. In other words, he de-
clared that Europe can never be Islamized 
and Muslims do not share the same Europe-
an culture or heritage created by Christian 
roots and values. The ignorance of Christian 
culture alienated Muslims in European civi-
lization. There is also a question of grow-
ing demographic importance of Muslims in 
Europe that disquiets Christians’ views of 
the changing nature of Europe, since it is 
becoming the second most popular religion 
after Christianity in Europe. The need for co-
existence with Muslim populations is also 
noted and highlighted, requiring a process 
of objective dialogues with Islam through 
mutual exchange of knowledge. The Vatican 
expressed the yearning not only for religious 
freedom in Europe, but also the promotion 
of religious liberties in other countries simi-
lar to those that European institutions en-
shrine. The European Union is a model for 
religious freedom and guarantees for every-
one’s beliefs. 
The Vatican believes that Europe can 
achieve a better role by insisting on reli-
gious rights in other countries where Chris-
tians are a minority. The Church asks for a 
fair interfaith project to include a religious 
plurality as evident in Europe today. The 
Turkish bid for EU membership seems to 
some Christian organizations to be an op-
portunity to exploit Turkey as a pivotal 
country to enhance the dialog with Muslim 
countries, thereby enhancing the possibili-
ties of strengthening the Christian minori-
ties’ rights in Muslim countries. Theologi-
cal traditions, national histories may result 
in the attitude of the Church (Protestants, 
Catholics and Orthodox) taking different 
positions regarding the support or rejection 
of Turkish accession to the EU (Minkenberg 
2012).   
Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to Turkey can 
be seen as an initiative to focus at first hand 
on relations with a Muslim country which 
is a candidate for EU membership, but the 
second important feature, highlighted more 
than the primary reason, was the visit to the 
historic Greek Orthodox community in Tur-
key that has struggled for religious freedom 
and rights for many years. The visit was re-
alized after the invitation of the Orthodox 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew who 
wished to emphasize the problems of ecu-
menical relations in Turkey.  The Patriarch 
outlined his expectations of support for reli-
gious rights and minorities before the visit. 
(National Catholic Reporter, 11) 
Christian Minorities in Turkey
The Church is more interested in minori-
ty rights in Turkey due to the diminutive 
Christian population. A massive immigra-
tion due to political and economical issues, 
has been observed in recent years in the 
Middle East which has changed the demog-
raphy of the Christian population in that 
conflicted area. After the war in Iraq, an-
ti-Christian sentiment was heightened and 
resulted in the departure of Christians from 
this country to Turkey. They saw Turkey as 
a stepping-stone to Europe. The Christians 
constitute less than 1% of the Turkish pop-
ulation. 
The demographic displacement at the 
end of 19th century (Karpat 1985) before the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire incited the 
new Turkish elite to focus on national iden-
tity after the proclamation of the Republic 
in 1923. The exclusion of the non-Muslims 
and the bilateral changes among the Turk-
ish-Muslim population with Greek ones re-
inforced Turkish nationalism and Turkish 
identity (Ozkırımlı and Sofos 2008; Icduygu 
and all 2008).
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In this new era, one’s religious back-
ground played a role as to whether one was 
considered as belonging to a minority or 
not. Those with Muslim origins even though 
they were from a great variety of ethnic and 
linguistic origins, were accepted as Turkish 
(Soner 2005). Non-Muslims remained clas-
sified as minorities. In the eyes of the repub-
lican élite, these differences did not inhibit 
the elegibility to Turkish citizenship. At that 
time, the non Muslim groups constituted 
15% of the population (Selek 1987, 64), they 
were not taken into account in the nation 
building process which was paradoxically 
based on Sunni Muslim identity (Ozkırımlı 
and Sofos 2008). The Christian communities 
were accepted as minority groups in Turkey 
after the Treaty of Lausanne that was signed 
at 1923 (Hirschon 2004). The treaty de-
scribed Gregorian Armenian, Greek-Ortho-
dox and Jewish communities as minorities 
(azınlık). They have a minority status that 
gives these communities some “privileges” 
with differential treatment such as hav-
ing their own schools. (Oran, 2003) Even 
if the Syriac Catholics and Orthodox were 
not mentioned in the treaty, the legal sys-
tem approves the minority status for these 
communities also. They benefit also from 
minority protection rules and treatment in 
social political life. Today, the national law 
and political reforms can be implemented in 
accordance with this treaty.  
The members of the Greek Orthodox 
Church in Turkey numbered around 5000 
after the exchange between Turkey and 
Greece after the First World War (Courbage 
and Fargues 1992, 228). At the beginning 
of the Republic, Turkey had an estimated 
180.000 Greek Orthodox citizens. Chris-
tians represent today about 0.2 % of the 
population which is approximately 132.000 
inhabitants, of whom 60,000 are mainly 
Armenian Monophysites (Apostolic) but 
also 20% Catholics and Protestants 10%. 
(Courbage and Fargues 1992) There are also 
Roman Catholics of Western origins, which 
are predominantly Levantine, and Eastern 
Christians from a Greco-Arabic tradition: 
in addition, the Assyrio-Chaldeans of Silopi 
whether attached or not to Rome and the 
Syriacs in Mardin, live mostly in the Midyat 
region but also in Yeşilköy in Istanbul. Less 
numerous are the Levantine English and 
American residents of Protestant confes-
sion. 
EU and Minority Rights in Tur-
key
According to European Commission 
yearly reports which are used by the Europe-
an Union, the regime, legislative and cultur-
al structures of Turkey regarding minorities 
do not protect minority rights or freedoms 
of minority groups, and the Lausanne Trea-
ty was not applied to provide the rights 
proposed in favour of declared minorities 
(Toktaş 492). The Articles 37-45 regulate 
the rights of the minorities in Turkey such 
as educational rights, religious freedom, and 
equality with other citizens, as well as pre-
serving cultural rights. The ineffectiveness 
of the minority protection was stated in 
every report as a violation of human rights. 
According to the same reports, the lack of 
clarity between minority status and non-
minority status was observed in the Turkish 
judicial system. The reports have not only re-
ferred to non-Muslims as a minority groups, 
but also expanded the definitions of these 
minority groups to include those in the light 
of their lack of human rights. (Reference to 
reports)  In this sense, the non-Muslims in 
Turkey are acknowledged in the report, and 
further, the other groups especially the Ale-
vis communities are also mentioned as be-
ing in need of improvements in their rights. 
Under the topic of freedom of religion and 
minority rights, the Commission underlines 
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the necessity for tolerance of the construc-
tion of places of worship and appeals for 
the opening of the Halki Seminary for the 
Orthodox Church.5 The issue of the Halki 
Seminary was regularly pointed out in re-
cent reports. In the regular report in 2001, 
a certain improvement was noted vis a vis 
the Chaldean community, giving them the 
right to return to their villages in South 
East Anatolian provinces. Another item of 
progress noted by the report was the per-
mission given to Chaldeans to build a new 
church in Istanbul. The restrictions and the 
long procedures related to acquisition and 
disposition of property for minority groups 
was introduced and detailed as a problem 
in 2003 report. The confiscation of founda-
tions, belonging to non Muslim communi-
ties, by the strict control of General Direc-
torate of Foundations was criticised in the 
report of that same year citing the example 
of the Greek Orphanage in Büyükada. The 
report stated also the difficulties when the 
Catholic and Protestant communities were 
asking for new places of worship. The re-
port claimed certain restrictions of facilities 
regarding the opening these new places of 
worship and enumerated some of the prob-
lems: establishing new foundations, prohi-
bitions of training clergy, visa problems for 
non Turkish citizens, clergy, and restrictions 
of opening of new minority schools. These 
problems are related to freedoms of minor-
ity rights as well as religious freedoms in 
Turkey, which are categorized as limited and 
controlled.  Regarding minority schools, an-
other problem that the minority communi-
ties encounter is a dual supervisory system 
in Turkey which imposes the authority of a 
Turkish deputy head of school. The Turkish 
National Educational Ministry intervenes 
in minority schools by appointing a Turkish 
5  The Halki Seminary was closed in 1971 after the 
coup d’etat. The law banned all higher education includ-
ing seminary institutions of minorities. 
deputy head.  
According to an annual overview and 
progress report of the Turkish enlargement 
policy, the achievement of Turkey in the im-
provement of human rights and freedom of 
religion is welcomed and freedom of wor-
ship is generally respected. The new govern-
ment’s initiatives concerning the rights of 
minorities was itemised favourably in the 
2011 report these included: the celebration 
of Divine Liturgy in Soumala Monastery, 
the practice of religious services on the is-
land of Akdamar, the opening of a Protes-
tant church in Van, the number of meetings 
with non Muslim religious leaders by the 
government, the first visit to the Orthodox 
Patriarch by a high ranking official since the 
1950s. 
However, the problems that faced the 
religious communities still continue, such 
as a lack of legal identity and constitutional 
framework, restrictions on the training of 
clergy, the banning of the usage of the ec-
clesiastical title ‘Ecumenical’ on all occasions 
by the Orthodox Greek Patriarch, and bar-
riers against the construction of places of 
worship.
 To analyse the role of Christian related 
organizations to see how they implement 
their policies in Christian minorities in Tur-
key, we have focused on micro and meso 
levels of structures and organizations. This 
research focuses on a survey of the views 
and attitudes of the members, founders and 
spokespersons to provide an opportunity to 
see how they work on an issue of institut-
ing a network. Our assumption has been 
that this survey of these views and attitudes 
among the members and persons that this 
research has been conducted in Brussels 
should provide a valuable examination of 
and insight into the current state of the im-
plementation of religious ideology in public 
policy. 
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Concerning religious liberties, CEC and 
COMECE voice their considerable concern 
about the treatment of Christian minori-
ties in Turkey which face many problems in 
terms of recognition of their rights, school-
ing, properties including the communities’ 
foundations and practical protection of 
Christian buildings and churches. The appeal 
to protect and to prevent the expropriation 
of the Syriac Orthodox Mor Gabriel monas-
tery became a campaign in the EU as an ex-
ample, to show the lack of legal protection of 
Christian churches in Turkey in 2008.   
Transnational Christian 
Network Organizations: An 
Advocacy Group in Brussels
Church related organizations are con-
sidered as transnational advocacy networks 
that have activists with relevant skills and 
influence, who share and support common 
ideals, values and discourses, working for a 
common cause. They have closely interwo-
ven information exchange links and services 
(Keck and Sikking 1998, 2). We refer to these 
transnational networks to acknowledge the 
quasi structural dimensions of these Chris-
tian activist groups and their mobilization. 
By examining the terminology of transna-
tional networks, insight is gained into the 
nature and activities of the organizations 
at meso and macro level. Scholars thereby 
give their expert analyses on international 
political theories and trends. Moreover, the 
political theories of these international and 
transnational groups and networks are stud-
ied in order to understand, and anticipate 
the shape and trends of international politi-
cal activities and their worldwide influences. 
This research however, draws instead 
upon sociological research that focuses on 
complex interactions among activists, re-
ligious institutions, and their identities. 
These have also been the concern of political 
sociology, comparative politics. Organiza-
tions and individuals within the advocacy 
or lobby network are considered political en-
trepreneurs who mobilize both material and 
symbolic resources (Keck and Sikking 1998, 
31). 
It is clear that a wide range of non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGO) are in-
creasingly involved in political, social, and 
economic policy developments in interna-
tional areas. Even for theses NGOs, the ob-
jectives and benefits vary from one to the 
other; they enhance their activities by cre-
ating networks and collaborations, as well 
as non-traditional partnerships facilitated 
by communication technology. (John Clark 
2003) These groups deliberately avoid the 
term of “lobbying” or “interest group” when 
asked directly how they define themselves, 
even though some of the political and eco-
nomical organizations classify themselves 
officially in that way in Brussels. 
The term  “interest group” indicates a 
group or an organization that adopts polit-
ical stances and manages certain strategies 
aimed at giving some benefits to its mem-
bers, financially or otherwise. Are these la-
bels of “interest group” or “lobbying” appro-
priate for Church groups or organizations at 
the EU level?  Does asking for the banning 
of abortion or helping in the producing of 
policies about social questions specifically 
related to religious freedom justify classify-
ing such organisations as interest groups? 
In some cases, they prefer to use the term 
“advocacy group” that means acting in the 
interests of an altruistic cause. In these 
cases, they promote their opinions on an 
issue; they acquire some political charac-
teristics in order to promote causes that are 
in accordance with their religious opinions 
or beliefs. Foret and Schlesinger consider 
religious organizations and associations in 
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Brussels as interest seeking groups (Foret 
and Schlesinger 2007).
 A simple definition of an advocacy group 
is “any organization that seeks to influence 
government policy, but not to govern” 
(Young and Everitt 2004, 5). According to 
this definition, there is a difference between 
a government, a political party and advoca-
cy groups. The first two entities aims have a 
political agenda and having a clear objective 
defined by government policy and demo-
cratic processes such as: legislation, voting, 
election; meanwhile, an advocacy group 
struggles to promote a specific or a gener-
al cause on a variety of non political issues 
such as the environment, food production 
and urban policies. 
The broad concept of this advocacy is 
defined within which a series of processes 
is initiated: determination of the lobby po-
sition; formulation of arguments; selection 
of targets of advocacy communications and 
choice of inside and outside lobbying tactics 
(Mahoney 2008, 33). Acquisition of selective 
benefits, to be shared by their members or 
a certain part of society, are some common 
characteristics of advocacy groups. On the 
other hand, some groups advocating for col-
lective benefits (Young and Everitt 2004, 6), 
do not necessarily represent only one group. 
Catholic organizations acting as as an 
advocate group tend to influence the gov-
ernment policies in their related areas. They 
set up or participate in a network on some 
issues such as the European Sunday Alli-
ance which is a network organization work-
ing on the “value of synchronized free time 
for European societies”. These are informal 
networks of groups and individuals sharing 
some similar or common vision and objec-
tives for social and political change. 
The Christian related organizations 
and groups employ a range of strategies in 
their quest to influence government de-
cisions. These tactics can range in nature 
from a spectrun of formal to informal, and/
or traditional to non-traditional. Examples 
of these activities include meetings with 
cabinet ministers, mayors, public servants, 
presenting briefs, attending government 
sponsored consultation, protests, rallies and 
signing petitions. Advocates must decide if 
they are going to mobilize resources for a 
policy debate, whether they are working to 
promote, modify, or block a proposal. Sec-
ondly, advocates must devise an argumenta-
tion strategy (Mahoney 2008, 33). A third 
critical segment of the advocacy process is 
the selection of lobbying targets to whom 
they will communicate their advocacy posi-
tions (Mahoney 2008, 33). 
Transnational Religious 
Activism 
In recent years, religion and politics 
have been interconnected and diffused at 
supra and transnational level; and transna-
tional civil organizations particularly, are 
more flexible in adopting new strategies for 
influencing policies and practices of gov-
ernments in transnational areas. Even if 
the omnipresence of the nation state still 
continues, the locus of policy making is re-
shaped and re-located. The international 
organizations take relatively certain roles in 
this policy shaping process that include civil 
activities to enhance the democratic partic-
ipation emphasizing political criteria in EU 
affairs (Leustean 2012). 
The European Parliament is a major ar-
ticulator of social and political issues. Many 
of its recommendations and proposals ap-
pear on the agenda of the Commission. The 
Parliament is considered a place where one 
can mobilize and develop forms of collective 
action among MEP’s and parties. By build-
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ing links transnationally and domestically 
between Christian Churches, the Vatican 
and the decision makers, the Churches’ re-
lated organizations multiply their channels 
of access to the decision makers and the 
processes they follow. In our analysis, we 
further investigate the formal institutional 
relationships, personnel contributions and 
party systems.  On some issues such as hu-
man rights, religious liberties, immigration 
and asylum, and international aid, they mo-
bilize international resources at EU level. 
Examples of the above include how 
COMECE and CEC maintain some strong 
relations with EU institutions and some po-
litical parties in Brussels by organizing sem-
inars and conferences with them. Recently, 
COMECE organized a seminar entitled 
“Christians in the Arab World: One year after 
the Arab Spring” with the following groups, 
the European People’s Party (EPP)  and Eu-
ropean Conservatives and Reformist Groups 
(ECR) in the European Parliament. 
The seminar focused on the rights of 
Christians in Middle East. Specific attention 
was given to liberal human rights, democra-
cy and the needs of Christians in the coun-
tries involved with the Arab Spring.  Samir 
Nassar, Maronite Archebishop in Damascus 
in Syria, Pierbattista Pizzaballa, Custodian 
of the Holy Land Jerusalem, and the former 
minister of Financial Affairs of Lebanon, 
Demianos Kattor were among the speak-
ers. Open Doors, a Christian organization 
working on behalf of persecuted Christians 
in the World, also presented the most recent 
activities against the Christians in the Mid-
dle East. Joe Vella Gauci, Advisor for Inter-
national Relations and Religious Freedom 
in COMECE highlighted the difficulties and 
challenges linked to the East-West conflicts, 
Islam and Europe issues. He advocated the 
elimination of parallel societies as a method 
of increasing diversity and equal rights for 
everyone including religious dimension. 
Questions come systematically at the EU 
level from the European External Action 
Service6 about enhancing the monitoring 
of Religious Freedom violations in Turkey. 
In this respect, the Churches emphasize the 
need for particular attention to the imple-
mentation of rights of minority churches 
and religious communities within countries 
that intend to join the EU.  They have not 
only strong relations with the EPP group in 
European Parliament, but also some MEPs 
from socialist and green party groups that 
come to support the KEK and COMECE. 
Analysis of campaigns, programs and 
working groups provides evidence of areas 
in which there is mobilization of Christian 
Churches’ resources for promotion of ideas 
in the ways they try to influence the policy 
makers. The focus on discourses of partici-
pants’ and individuals’ involved in Church 
related organizations in Brussels highlights 
their relationships, acts of cooperation, and 
their establishment of connections. This 
study also identifies the kinds of resources 
used, both symbolic and material, and their 
references. The embodiment of relationships 
with symbolic and material allocations, il-
lustrates the extent of the structural reach-
es of the COMECE, both at domestic and 
international levels. They create some op-
portunities for structural change for which 
the members use their internal resources. 
“Activists in networks try not only to influ-
ence policy outcomes, but to transform the 
terms and nature of the debate.” (Keck and 
Sikking, 2). 
At the various stages of the formation of 
organizational strategies and arrangements, 
we see how the Church implements, in the 
EU, political discourses according to their 
6  Established after the treaty of Lison in 2009 which 
serves as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps of EU. 
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agenda, specifically regarding Turkey’s can-
didacy. In this analysis of the strategies, the 
aim is not to look at the issues of leadership, 
representation, legitimacy, or authority. 
The use of new technologies and the In-
ternet allow citizens to network with one 
another at individual, group, and organiza-
tional levels. As a result, a web based and 
oriented social movement is formed through 
certain religious-humanitarian causes.  Us-
ing web networks enables non-conventional 
partnerships in different areas increasingly 
working with other NGO’s targeting their 
causes (Clark 2003, 2).  In the case of Church 
based organizations, they seek to collabo-
rate with other faiths to further their cam-
paigns, in order to mobilize more human 
resources and exert more pressure on what 
they identify as their priorities. To increase 
the strength of the Church objectives in dif-
ferent areas, they tend to work as an inter-
national negotiating force to influence poli-
cies of inter-governmental organizations.  
As argued by Clark (2003, 5) two key ele-
ments are decisive for the transnational ac-
tivities and organizations in which citizens 
take part: the degree of decentralization and 
the decision making and implementing pro-
cesses using volunteers. The effective exploi-
tation of the knowledge and skills of these 
volunteers in the process of decision making 
and the stages and forms of organization are 
important in understanding how an organi-
zation functions and which kind of models 
they adopt. There are other variables to de-
termine the character of any organization: 
the recruitment schemes, kinds of activi-
ties, the links between members and other 
organizations. Facing the challenges of 
membership controls and the issues of the 
restrictions of belonging to any structured 
organization, social movements and organi-
zations tend to work independently of such 
given forms and models to gather different 
forces to achieve their own aims.
Relations with Political Parties 
In which way do the Christian Church-
es co-organize with Christian Democratic 
parties in Europe, especially with the EPP 
in the European Parliament? What are the 
positions of Christian Democratic parties 
on ethical issues? Christian Democracy is a 
generic term, which contains various politi-
cal ideas and characteristics represented by 
the Christian Democratic Parties in Europe. 
What does the label of Christian Democracy 
signify? The framework in which Christian 
Democracy is shaped and defined is a wide-
spread term, neither geographically lim-
ited nor with common features. (Van Hecke 
and Gerard 2004) The challenge of defining 
Christian Democracy and what the Christian 
values in politics for Christian Democrat 
parties represent, pose some of the main re-
search questions and subjects for analyses. 
Christian Democratic Party and Christian 
Democracy are highly sensitive in France; 
for example even the centrist party of Fran-
çois Bayrou is known as a Christian Demo-
crat movement. There is a second party led 
by Christine Boutin, established in 2001 and 
an associated party of the UMP of Sarkozy. 
These Christian Democratic parties are ac-
cepted as socially heterogeneous by Kalyvas, 
they are pseudo bureaucratic organizations, 
which have a strong relationships with 
Christian faith but each redefining policies 
in their own way when faced with liberal de-
mocracy in Europe (Kalyvas 1996, 264). The 
question in our research relating to these 
relationships is how the Church affiliated 
organizations manage this secularization 
of faith in these parties. How are their de-
mands articulated in EPP groups? What is 
their influence on EPP in the parliament? 
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It has been commonly argued that there 
are strong affiliations and relationships be-
tween the Church and EPP parties in the EP. 
Such an interpretation of the relationship 
between the Church related organization 
and EPP parties is some cases simplistic. 
Strong Church affiliated organizations can 
not only co-exist and deal with EPP parties, 
but in fact they make alliances with other 
political parties to strengthen the effect of 
their campaigns and policies on issues such 
as Sunday observance, immigration and 
asylum seekers. There is some political de-
pendence in terms of voting and election, a 
Christian prefers to vote and support Chris-
tian Democratic parties, but we have take 
into consideration the transformations of 
the Christian Democratic parties during the 
last forty years. The closeness of the links 
between the Church organisations and po-
litical parties varies from one political arena 
to another. The links between Church and 
political parties change and are adapted ac-
cording to national contexts. Nevertheless, 
the close integration seen between Trade 
Unions and Social Democratic or Labour 
Parties is not a common characteristic be-
tween Christian Democratic Parties and 
Church related organizations. Even though 
the Trade Unions are not part of the Labour 
Parties, there is a strong affiliation. (Wilson 
1990, 159) As noted by Wilson (1990), some 
interest groups believe that non-partisan 
activities would enhance their influence and 
mobilization power; for this reason, in this 
field, Christian groups deny that they have 
an official affiliation with Christian Demo-
cratic Parties or a commitment to them. A 
partisan commitment is seen as an aliena-
tion from their responsibilities, because it 
is incompatible with their “faith transcend-
ing politics”. They do not want to lose moral 
standing and credibility by being identified 
with only one political party.
Conclusion
The Turkish candidacy has created new 
opportunities for the Christian minorities 
living in Turkey. The Christian Church in 
Europe has established a multi dimensional 
approach to improve certain politics and 
positions with EU institutions. The EU rec-
ognizes the protection of minority rights as 
one of the fundamental conditions for any 
country to becoming an EU member state. 
The Copenhagen criterion is a step towards 
establishing some standards on this set 
of issues, to develop certain practices and 
reforms for candidate states in order to 
progress cultural and religious rights. The 
Church affiliated organizations support civil 
initiatives in order to be able to influence 
and maintain a sustainable democratic con-
trol through the EU institutions. The trans-
national network of Churches preserves dy-
namism to protect Christian minorities in 
Turkey and encourage Turkey to make pro-
gress on this issue, by challenging the cur-
rent conventional statuses of the Christian 
minorities. The voices of Christian Churches 
in Brussels drawing these issues to the at-
tention of the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Commission have 
been claimed by the religious minorities in 
Turkey to have improved their social, cultur-
al and political conditions: religious freedom 
including training of clergy, discrimination, 
education and schooling is still needed. 
Even though the recent reforms have 
ameliorated certain rights of Christians, as a 
result of these Church voices, the EU found 
the reforms still insufficient to resolve the 
whole minorities question and demands fur-
ther juridical change and transformation of 
the country in which minorities’ rights are 
still viewed as needing strengthening and 
protection. 
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The pretexts of security problems and 
the maintenance of the unity of Turkey are 
two main concerns that cause the non Mus-
lim minorities in Turkey to be framed as al-
iens and threats. The EU processes challenge 
these classic representations of minorities 
as alien national threats, attitudes which are 
endemic in current Turkish public opinion, 
and thereby likely to push into crisis the pre-
sent model of the Turkish nation state. 
This article shows how the transnational 
institutions and communities engage with 
the state invoking ways of inclusive identity 
and citizenship in terms of religion and eth-
nicity. As Tarrow (2006, 2) asserts, transna-
tionalism is transformative when organiza-
tion and institutions connect the local with 
the global, the domestic politics with the 
international. The Church uses its influen-
tial transnational activism and networks be-
tween states and international institutions 
to modify local domestic politics through 
new indirect forms of redirections and ad-
justments of political actions, of group iden-
tities and policy definitions. 
This subtle indirect transnational activ-
ism changes the attitudes of the participant 
bodies not only at individual or structural 
level, but also at meso levels. There is no 
homogenous, clearly defined attitude vis-à-
vis Turkey’s bid for EU membership among 
the Christian Church organizations, but 
the issue of Christian minorities in Turkey 
reflects well how a transnational cultural 
identity can, through concerted indirect ac-
tion, be subtly introduced and blended into 
the socio-religious structure of a Muslim 
country that would like to be a member of a 
“Christian Europe”. 
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